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However, firms using accrual accounting exhibit statistically lower interest rates after controlling for many
factors associated with the cost of debt. Further, the interest rate benefits from accrual accounting are
greatest when the borrower׳s credit score is low and/or the length of its banking relationship with the
lender is short. This evidence indicates that accrual accounting can benefit small business borrowers, but
that the information contained in third-party credit scores and obtained through ongoing banking
relationships can substitute for the incremental information provided by accrual accounting.
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ABSTRACT: We examine whether more sophisticated accounting methods (in the form of accrual
accounting) interacts with other information sources and the pledging of collateral to reduce information
asymmetries between small business borrowers and lenders, thereby lowering borrowers’ probability of
loan denial and cost of debt. We find that higher third party credit scores, but not the use of accrual
accounting, decrease the likelihood of loan denial. However, firms using accrual accounting exhibit
statistically lower interest rates after controlling for many factors associated with the cost of debt.
Further, third-party credit scores and information obtained through ongoing banking relationships appear
to substitute for the incremental information from accrual accounting, with the benefits from accruals
decreasing in the firm’s credit score and relationship length. We find little evidence that any of the
alternative information sources influence loan decisions when collateral is pledged, consistent with
theories that collateral provides an alternative means for addressing information asymmetry problems.
Finally, our results indicate that borrower characteristics such as the firm's age and legal liability further
moderate the relations between the various information sources and interest rates.
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Alternative Information Sources and Information Asymmetry Reduction:
Evidence from Small Business Debt
1. INTRODUCTION
A substantial body of accounting research examines the influence of “higher quality” or
“more sophisticated” accounting information on a firm's cost of debt capital (see Armstrong et al.,
2010 for a review). In theory, borrowers can reduce information asymmetries with lenders by
providing higher quality accounting information prepared using more sophisticated methods, thereby
increasing access to debt financing and lowering interest rates. Although existing studies provide
some support for this proposition, they typically ignore the role played by alternative information
sources that may alter or reduce the ability of more sophisticated accounting methods to convey
useful and relevant information, leading Beyer et al. (2010, p. 116) to conclude “that one of the
biggest challenges and opportunities facing researchers is considering the interactions among the
various information sources.”
We begin to address this challenge by examining the influence of alternative information
sources and their interactions on small business lending decisions. Lenders are the primary external
users of financial reports from small, privately-held firms (Nair and Rittenberg, 1983).

When

submitting loan applications, potential borrowers must provide some form of financial information,
which can vary in sophistication from simple bank statements and tax returns to more sophisticated
accounting statements prepared using generally-accepted accounting principles.

However,

accounting reports are not the only source of "hard" information lenders can use to assess loan
applications. 1

Small business credit scores prepared by third parties offer another method for

obtaining hard, quantified information on borrowers (Petersen, 2004), potentially reducing any
1

Petersen (2004) defines hard information as being “quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways,
and its content is independent of the collection process.” In contrast, soft information is “not easily or accurately reducible
to a numerical score, and cannot be communicate this information to the broader lending markets and thus negotiate a
lower loan rate from its bank” (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).

1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125146

informational advantages from more such accounting reports. Credit scoring agencies gather data on
credit payment history, business demographics, other public information such as liens, judgments,
and bankruptcy proceeding, and (in some cases) financial information to assess the probability that
borrowers will meet their loan obligations, giving lenders an alternative method for evaluating loan
applications and monitoring borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Berger and Frame, 2007). Even
more important may be the “softer,” more subtle information obtained through a lender's existing
relationship with a borrower. Theoretical and empirical studies suggest that relationship banking
information may be a better source of information about small business credit worthiness than “hard,”
quantitative information such as accounting reports or credit scores (e.g., Greenbaum et al., 1989;
Sharpe, 1990; Diamond, 1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cowen and Cowen, 2006), potentially
subsuming any incremental information provided by more sophisticated accounting reports. Yet,
despite the availability of these various hard and soft information sources, evidence on the extent to
which the alternative sources act as complements or substitutes in reducing information asymmetries
in small (or large) business lending decisions is limited.
We investigate the interactive effects of accounting information, credit scores, and
relationship banking on the availability and cost of debt using a sample of small, privately-held U.S.
companies with fewer than 500 employees, gathered in the Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF)
conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Our proxy for accounting sophistication is the use of accrual
accounting, one of the most fundamental properties of generally-accepted accounting principles.
Unlike larger firms, the small businesses in our sample have no tax or external reporting requirements
to use accrual accounting, making its use a voluntary choice. More sophisticated accrual accounting
methods are argued to provide incremental information above cash-based accounts, thereby offering a
better indicator of company performance and financial standing, and reducing information
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. These claims suggest that lenders will be more likely to
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provide loans and offer lower interest rates to firms using accrual accounting. However, if third party
credit scores and/or relationship banking provide complementary or substitute means for reducing
information asymmetries, any potential benefits from accrual accounting may be moderated by the
information provided by these alternative sources.
In addition to using alternative information sources to address information asymmetry
problems, lenders can adjust contractual characteristics (Armstrong et al., 2010).

In the small

business setting, the primary debt contract characteristic used to address information asymmetries is
the provision of collateral by borrowers (Berger and Udell, 2006). Economic theories argue that
collateral can serve as an alternative to higher quality information for reducing information
asymmetry problems between small business borrowers and lenders (Coco, 2000). These claims
suggest that any loan advantages from higher quality accounting (or other) information will be
minimized when the borrower has pledged collateral.
We find little evidence that accrual accounting reduces the likelihood of loan denial after
controlling for other factors previously found to be associated with small business loan decisions.
These (and our other) results are robust to controlling for self-selection in the decision to apply for a
loan and endogeneity in the choice to use accrual accounting. However, higher credit scores are
negatively associated with loan denial, suggesting that the broad third-party information contained in
these scores is used in the initial decision to accept or deny the application, while the incremental
information from accrual accounting has little influence on this decision. This evidence is consistent
with experimental and qualitative studies finding that the initial approval decision is based on simple,
aggregate financial information and other general background data (such as that contained in credit
scores) rather than on the analysis of detailed accounting information (Danos et al., 1989; Berry et al.,
1993), as well as with banks' increasing use of automated loan approval models based on credit
scores (Petersen, 2004).

3

In contrast, accrual accounting is negatively associated with the initial interest rate on
approved loans, consistent with this more sophisticated accounting method reducing information
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers.

However, the interest rate benefits from accrual

accounting decrease when the borrower's credit score is higher and/or the length of its banking
relationship with the lender is longer. That is, firms with lower (higher) credit scores and/or shorter
(longer) banking relationships receive greater (smaller) interest rate benefits from accrual accounting.
Further analysis indicates that accrual accounting only has a significant influence on interest rates in
firms with extremely low credit scores and very short banking relationships. Similar substitution
effects are found for credit scores and relationship lengths. For example, any interest rate benefits
from higher credit scores appear to be limited to businesses without longstanding relationships with
their lenders, and vice versa.
This evidence supports claims that the information obtained in extended banking relationships
supersedes other sources of information for small business lending decisions. Similarly, firms with
easily obtainable third-party credit scores that are sufficiently high receive little benefit from more
sophisticated accrual accounting methods.

Supplemental tests provide no evidence that the

preparation of financial statements (defined as an income statement and a balance sheet) or the
provision of audited financial statements influence lending decisions in our sample, regardless of the
use or nonuse of accrual accounting, credit scores, or relationship length. Further analysis indicates
that any benefits from these alternative information sources is minimized by the pledging of
collateral, consistent with theories that debt contract characteristics can substitute for more
informative hard and soft information. Finally, we find that other firm characteristics such as the
firm's age and legal liability also moderate the relations between the various information sources and
interest rates. Overall, our results suggest that requiring small, private businesses to prepare financial
statements using more sophisticated accounting methods is likely to benefit only a subset of

4

borrowers and lenders. More importantly, our tests point out the importance of considering the
interactions between various information sources and contractual characteristics when assessing the
benefits from different accounting practices.
This study makes three related contributions to the accounting literature. First, we extend the
limited but growing body of research on small, privately-held businesses, a major sector of the
economy. 2 Accounting standard-setters are placing increasing emphasis on accounting methods in
these firms. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Financial Accounting
Standards Board (AICPA/FASB, 2006), for example, have established a joint committee to
investigate accounting standards in private businesses, most of which are small. Similarly, the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, 2007) has proposed new accounting standards for
small- and medium-sized entities. In addressing these issues, both the AICPA/FASB committee and
IASB state that they will consider the benefits to external accounting statement users. Recent
accounting studies suggest that more sophisticated audited or accruals-based financial statements can
lower the cost of small, private business debt, but do not examine firms using cash accounting (Kim
et al., 2007; Minnis, 2010) or firms using accrual accounting but not having financial statements
(Allee and Yohn, 2009). None of these studies investigates the influence of alternative information
sources, the focus of this study. Similarly, a number of banking studies have examined the impact of
banking relationships (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Petersen, 2004) or
credit scores (e.g., Frame et al., 2001; Berger et al., 2005; Berger and Frame, 2007) on small business
lending, but have ignored the role of accounting information. By examining the joint influence of
these alternative information sources on small business lending decisions, we provide evidence on the
informational settings in which more sophisticated accounting methods (in our case the use of
accruals) are likely to provide the greatest benefit to small business borrowers and lenders.
2

See Botosan et al. (2006) and IFA (2006) for reviews of studies on financial accounting practices in small
businesses.
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Second, we extend research on the broader question of the relative informativeness of more
sophisticated or “higher quality” accounting by investigating a setting where accounting
sophistication varies substantially and information asymmetries are relatively large. Like large,
public companies, the information environment in small businesses includes accounting information,
voluntary disclosures of other “hard” and “soft” information, and information produced by third-party
intermediaries.

However, the small firm setting has the advantage of having fewer competing

information sources and no mandatory accounting practices that may affect observed associations
between accounting sophistication and lending decisions. In addition, because accrual accounting is
a voluntary choice in our sample, we can examine the benefits from more sophisticated accrual
accounting using a direct measure of the underlying accounting technology employed by the firm
rather than an earnings-based “accruals quality” proxy that is prone to measurement error (Beyer et
al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2010). As a result, our small business sample offers cleaner tests of the
influence of and interactions between alternative information sources on the cost of debt than is
possible using data from large, public companies.
Third, we respond to calls in the accounting and banking literatures to examine the
interactions between alternative information choices and debt contract characteristics (e.g.,
Armstrong et al., 2010; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). Our evidence indicates that lenders
attempt to reduce information asymmetry problems either through the information provided by
alternative information sources or through collateral requirements. These results indicate that future
studies must consider broader information and contractual environments when assessing the
implications of accounting practices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.

The next section reviews related

literature and develops our research questions. Section 3 outlines our research design. Empirical
results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.

6

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
2.1. Information Asymmetries and Small Business Lending Decisions
Lenders base loan approval and pricing decisions on the assessed probability of applicants’
ability to repay loans.

However, information asymmetries between firm managers and lenders

generally result in insiders having better information on the firm’s past and future economic
performance and, consequently, on firm default risk (Sengupta, 1998; Bharath et al., 2008).
Information asymmetries tend to be greater in small, private businesses, which often have little
institutional history and are not required to publicly disclose company-specific information (Butler et
al., 2007). As a result, these businesses tend to be more informationally opaque than larger, publiclylisted firms, increasing information risk and potentially influencing lending decisions.
Berger and Udall (2006) argue that financial institutions use four primary methods to
compensate for information asymmetries in small business lending decisions: (1) accounting-based
lending; (2) credit scoring; (3) relationship lending; and (4) collateral-based lending. 3 The following
sections discuss these methods and their potential interactions in small business lending decisions.
2.2. Accounting-Based Lending
One way for small businesses to reduce information asymmetries is providing more
informative financial reports. Lenders require small businesses to submit at least some financial
information, such as tax returns or financial statements, with their loan applications.

This

information can be prepared using cash or accrual accounting. 4
Much of the accounting literature assumes that accrual accounting is more informative than
cash accounting, and surveys find that small business lenders rate accrual accounting their preferred
3

Two additional small business lending methods identified by Berger and Udell (2006) are factoring of accounts
receivable and leasing. These methods are not included in our study.
4

As discussed in more detail later, small, private businesses in the U.S. are not required to use accrual
accounting for securities regulation purposes, and generally do not need to use accrual accounting for tax purposes unless
their sales exceed $5 million. In other countries, small, private firms may be legally required to use accrual accounting
for financial reporting or tax purposes (IFA, 2006).
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source of financial information for decision-making (Baker and Cunningham, 1993; AICPA, 2004).
Since economic transactions are often separate and distinct from their associated cash flows, accrual
accounting allows firms to overcome timing and matching problems that make cash accounting a
noisy measure of performance (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992; Dechow, 1994). Through the use of accruals,
non-cash economic transactions can be reflected in financial reports in a more timely manner that
better matches revenues and costs, thereby providing a better indication of enterprise performance
(FASB, 1978). The use of accrual accounting may also provide a positive signal of firm management
since this method is typically assumed to reflect greater management sophistication and higher
accounting quality, and management may use accruals to signal private information (e.g., Louis and
Robinson, 2005). If these potential benefits reduce information asymmetries between applicants and
lenders and signal greater credit worthiness, loan denials and interest rates should be lower in small
businesses using accrual accounting.
In contrast, some argue that cash accounting provides more informative information on small
business applicants’ ability to meet their loan obligations, which is the primary financial question
facing lenders. For information beyond cash flows to be incorporated into accounting reports,
management requires discretion to determine accruals levels. While discretion can be used by
management to reflect private information and non-cash economic transactions, management can also
use this discretion to distort the reported financial performance and position of the firm for selfinterested purposes.

Consistent with lenders recognizing the possibility that borrowers may

manipulate accruals to improve reported financial standing, survey evidence from loan officers and
financial analysts suggests that the objective nature of cash relative to accruals is an important benefit
for lending decisions (Jones, 1998; Jones and Widjaja, 1998).

If the net effect of managerial

discretion in determining accruals is providing less informative accounting information, then accrual
accounting should not be associated with greater loan acceptance or lower interest rates.
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Accounting reports based on cash flows may also provide sufficient information to evaluate
solvency and the probability of default, without any of the incremental information provided by
accruals. Jones et al. (1995) and Lee (1993) summarize a number of arguments for why cash
accounting may be at least as beneficial as accrual accounting for lending decisions. In addition to
the arbitrary nature of accruals, these arguments include cash accounting being more predictive of
future cash flows and financial distress in many businesses; providing a relatively unambiguous
measure of managerial performance; and emphasizing the primary importance of cash resources for
ongoing liquidity and solvency. An AICPA (2004) survey supports the notion that cash accounting
may be sufficient for many small business lending decisions, finding that 57.7 percent of lenders do
not require accrual accounting from private borrowers.
Although considerable debate exists over the relative benefits of cash and accrual accounting
for small business lending decisions, empirical evidence is limited. Francis et al. (2005) and Bharath
et al. (2008) examine the implications of accruals “quality” for debt contracting in large, public
companies. They find lower costs of debt when accruals quality is higher. However, since their
sample firms are required to use accrual accounting, these analyses shed no light on the relative
benefits of cash and accrual accounting. 5
Experimental studies have examined the relative importance of these two accounting methods
for lending decisions, with mixed results. Riahi-Belakaoui (1992) finds that loan officers examining
cash- or accrual-based financial statements from the same company show a clear preference for
accrual accounting when determining the firm’s ability to repay its loans, loan acceptance, and
interest rate. Sharma and Iselin’s (2003) experiment, on the other hand, indicates that bankers’
5

Other evidence from listed firms, which are required to use accrual accounting, suggests that analysts find cash
flows more important in assessing firm value among highly levered firms, and that analysts are more likely to disseminate
cash flow forecasts when the firm is in poor financial health (DeFond and Hung 2003; Previts et al., 1994), both of which
may be true of many small businesses. In addition, Hanlon et al. (2006) find that changes in tax laws that required large
firms to use accrual accounting for tax purposes caused the informativeness of the accrual-based external financial
statements to decline in firms that previously used cash accounting for tax purposes.
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judgments regarding solvency are more accurate using cash flow information than using accrual
accounting. Jones’ (1998) experiment concludes that cash flow statements, compared to accrualbased financial statements, have comparable or greater decision-making influence across a broad
variety of lending decisions.
In a related study using the 2003 SSBF data, Allee and Yohn (2009) examine the
determinants and lending consequences of financial statement preparation in small businesses. As
part of this analysis, Allee and Yohn incorporate a single indicator variable measuring whether firms
that report using financial statements (defined as the use of a balance sheet and income statement) to
answer the SSBF survey questions and using accrual accounting have lower probability of loan
denial and lower interest rates. They find mixed support for these predictions. However, their
sample includes firms with sales greater than $5 million (which generally are required to use accrual
accounting for tax purposes and therefore did not make the voluntary choice to use accruals) and
excludes firms that use accrual accounting but did not use financial statements when responding to
the survey. In fact, 26.1 percent of the firms in our loan application sample report using accrual
accounting but not using financial statements when responding to the survey, and only 10.2 percent
report using accruals and financial statements. Thus, Allee and Yohn’s study provides only a partial
analysis of the influence of accrual accounting on small business lending decisions.
2.3. Credit Scores And Lending Decisions
Accounting reports are not the only source of information lenders can use to evaluate the
financial condition and riskiness of potential borrowers. Credit scores are now readily available for
many small businesses. These scores, which can be purchased from credit rating agencies such as
Dun & Bradstreet and Experian, incorporate a broad set of information on past credit history,
business demographics, other public information on financial history, and (in some cases) firm
accounting information (typically provided by the small business itself and not required to be
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prepared using accrual accounting). For example, Dun & Bradstreet credit scores (which are the
most widely-used small business credit scores and the scores used in our analyses) are primarily
based on the owners’ and firm’s credit payment history, along with information from public filings
(e.g., bankruptcy proceedings, judgments, and suits), and (when provided by the firm) financial
information on sales, net worth, and working capital (Kallberg and Udell, 2003). Firms are not
required to submit financial data to Dun & Bradstreet, and when they do it typically includes only
balance sheet information. For competitive reasons, very few firms submit income statement data to
credit rating agencies, so this information generally is not incorporated into their credit scores.
Kallberg and Udell (2003) find that information in Dun & Bradstreet credit scores (particularly credit
payment history) exhibits significant incremental ability to predict small business failure, over and
above accounting information.
The economics literature on small business lending suggests that the “hard,” quantitative
information in credit scores provides a cost effective method for lenders to evaluate loan applications
and monitor borrowers (e.g., Frame et al., 2001; Akhavein et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2005; Berger
and Frame, 2007). Broader availability of third-party credit scores and reduced cost of information
transfer have led an increasing number of banks to utilize these scores in loan approval and riskbased pricing models (Cowen and Cowen, 2006; Petersen, 2004), either using the scores by
themselves or in conjunction with other information. 6 Cowen and Cowen’s (2006) survey of banks’
use of credit scores supports the claimed advantages from this information source, with the highest
ranked reason for adopting credit scoring being quantifying credit evaluation, followed by
simplifying loan applications and inexpensive access to additional information. On the other hand,
neither credit scores nor accruals may have a significant effect on lending decisions. Banks rank cash
flow information the most important factor in small business loan approval decisions, far above credit
6

Lenders can develop their own credit scores instead of using scores from third-party vendors. However, 78.6
percent of banks surveyed by Cowen and Cowen (2006) use small business credit scores purchased from third-parties.
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scores (Cowen and Cowen, 2006), suggesting that cash accounting information may be sufficient for
lending decisions.
2.4. Relationship Lending
The discussion thus far has focused on the influence of “hard” information on lending
decisions. While the hard information in accounting reports and credit scores may be important
factors in small business lending decisions, even more important may be the “soft” information
obtained through ongoing banking relationships (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994;
Petersen, 2004). This information, such as a loan officer’s knowledge of the potential borrower’s
ability, character, and trustworthiness, is “soft” in the sense that it is hard to quantify and
communicate to others, and may not be verifiable by outsiders. If the accuracy of information
regarding a potential borrower increases the longer the relationship between the parties exists, and
thereby reduces information asymmetries, past dealings with a borrower may provide superior
information for assessing credit worthiness (Diamond, 1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
Despite the potential informational advantages from ongoing banking relationships, their
theoretical influence on lending decisions is unclear. Boot and Thakor (1994) show that interest rates
decline as the savings from the bank’s improved knowledge of the borrower is passed on to the
borrower. In contrast, Greenbaum et al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990) predict that interest rates increase
with relationship length as the bank’s improved knowledge may “lock in” the borrower in the
relationship. The conflicting theoretical predictions are mirrored in the mixed empirical evidence on
the impact of relationship duration on interest rates (e.g., Ongena and Smith, 2001; Petersen and
Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; Bharath et al., 2009). Thus, the influence of
banking relationships on loan decisions remains unclear, particularly in the presence of other
information sources.
2.5. Interactions Among Alternative Information Sources
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While each of the above information sources is part of the firm’s “information environment,”
little empirical research has been devoted to the interdependencies and complementarities between
accounting and other information sources (Beyer et al., 2010). For example, whether firm-produced
accounting information, third-party credit scores, and soft information from on-going banking
relationships are complementary or substitute information sources is unclear. Berger and Udell
(2006) argue that banks can use combinations of these information sources to minimize information
asymmetry problems. Similarly, Cowen and Cowen (2006) suggest that banks can supplement thirdparty credit scores with additional information such as financial reports based on accrual accounting,
with the combined information sources acting as complements and further reducing information
asymmetries.

Other studies, however, suggest that these alternative information sources are

substitutes. Bharath et al. (2009), for example, find that the benefits from relationship lending are
nullified if the firm has publicly-rated debt. Brown and Zehnder’s (2007) experiment shows credit
scores have little effect on lending decisions in settings with repeated interactions between borrowers
and lenders. Cowen and Cowen’s (2006) survey finds that respondents rank banking relationships as
the dominant factor in small business lending decisions, despite the availability of accounting
information and credit scores
The mixed empirical results for the three individual information sources, together with the
availability of alternative information sources, has led to calls for researchers to examine the
interactions among these sources when assessing their impact on lending decisions (Armstrong et al.,
2010; Byers et al., 2010; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). These calls lead to our first research
question:
To what extent do accrual accounting, credit scores, and relationship banking interact to
influence small business lending decisions?

2.6. The Moderating Effects of Collateral
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Rather than relying on information gathering to mitigate information asymmetries with
potential borrowers, lenders can modify loan contract features. In the small business lending context,
this frequently takes the form of collateral pledging (Berger and Udell, 2006; Steijvers and
Voordeckers, 2009). Economic theories contend that collateral can reduce information asymmetry
problems through two means (see Coco, 2000, for a review). First, pledging collateral can reduce
adverse selection problems by serving as a screening mechanism, with higher quality borrowers more
willing to put their assets at stake. Second, collateral can play an incentive role by increasing the
borrower’s effort and minimizing the probability that the borrower will shift from low-risk to higherrisk projects, thereby reducing moral hazard problems. However, despite these potential benefits,
empirical evidence on the value of collateral as an information asymmetry reducing tool is
inconsistent. Steijvers and Voordeckers’ (2009) review concludes that a plausible explanation for the
mixed results, and a major limitation of this literature, is examining the use of collateral in isolation
of other information asymmetry reducing mechanism such as hard and soft information sources. This
conclusion is reinforced by Bharath et al.’s (2008) finding that the use of collateral is more frequent
when accruals “quality” is lower. The potential tradeoffs between the alternative information sources
and loan contract features leads to our second research question:
To what extent does the pledging of collateral substitute for higher quality information
sources in small business lending decisions?

These open empirical questions are of significant importance since firms have the discretion
to invest in greater accounting sophistication and, with sufficient time, to transact with lenders to
reduce information asymmetries, potentially leading to greater access to capital and lower cost of
debt. However, if these benefits are only obtained under certain conditions, such as settings where
alternative information sources or contractual features do not adequately minimize information
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asymmetry problems, then mandatory or across-the-board promotion of greater accounting
sophistication to improve small business access to capital may not be appropriate.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3. Sample
We examine the implications of interactions between accrual accounting and alternative
information sources on small business debt using data from the 2003 Survey of Small Business
Finance (SSBF) administrated by the U.S. Federal Reserve and Small Business Administration. The
2003 SSBF is a nationally representative sample of 4,240 non-farm, non-subsidiary business
enterprises with fewer than 500 employees. A stratified random sampling procedure based on
employment size, urban/rural status, and census divisions (as reported in Dun’s Market Identifier file)
was employed. The survey used a two-stage collection process. First, an initial interview assessed
firm eligibility for the SSBF using the preceding criteria. Second, a main telephone interview of
eligible establishments was conducted, with an average duration of 59 minutes. The overall response
rate was 32 percent (FRB, 2006).
We remove publicly-held entities (n = 5) and those with missing or non-positive assets, sales,
or shareholders (n = 508). We also remove 351 corporations that were not S-corporations or were
partnerships with annual gross receipts above $5 million since these entities are prohibited from using
cash accounting for tax purposes (IRS, 1999). 7 We eliminate these observations to focus on firms
that have no regulatory requirement to use accrual accounting for any purpose. As a result, the
7

Later versions of IRS Publication 538 were released in March 2004, January 2007, and March 2008, but the
1999 version was the most current at the time of the 2003 SSBF. Additional regulatory triggers related to inventory,
corporate form, and operations may also require accrual accounting. However, several regulatory exemptions override
these triggers. Rev. Proc. 2001-10 and Rev. Proc. 2002-28 provide detailed exemptions for entities with gross annual
receipts under $1 million and $10 million, respectively. In unreported results, we repeated the analyses using firms with
gross annual receipts under $1 million or under $10 million. The findings are consistent with those reported. However,
the interest rate findings for accrual accounting are slightly stronger in magnitude when gross receipts are under $1
million. In addition to tax requirements, the Securities and Exchange Commission mandates the use of accrual accounting
for: 1) all listed firms; 2) firms that previously offered shares under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with greater than
300 shareholders in the class of offered securities; or 3) firms with $10 million in assets and 500 shareholders. Our
sample does not meet any of these conditions.
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sample reflects firms that voluntarily chose to use cash or accrual accounting. We also remove 83
entities that did not have a credit score or did not respond to the accrual accounting question.
We further restrict the sample to firms that recently applied for a loan, provided the outcome
of the application, and provided responses to survey questions on the factors predicted to be
associated with loan denial. These criteria reduce the sample to 1,385. Finally, in tests examining
interest rate determinants, we restrict the sample to the subset of firms with recent debt financing that
provided the interest rate on their most recent loan and had no missing responses to the questions
used for our independent variables. These criteria reduce the number of firms in our interest rate
analyses to 1,191.
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process for the study, and Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in our analyses. The mean
(median) firm has assets of $1,581,371 ($144,544), with 92 percent managed by an owner of the firm
and 85 percent family owned.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Availability and Cost of Debt. Respondents applying for at least one loan in the
previous three years were asked whether their loan applications were approved. Consistent with
previous research, we assess the availability of debt using the variable Loan denial, which equals one
if the entity was denied credit on any loan requests during this period, and zero otherwise. Eleven
percent of the firms that applied for loans were denied in the previous three years. We measure the
cost of debt using the variable Interest rate, which is the original interest rate on the most recently
approved loan or line of credit. 8 The mean (median) initial interest rate is 5.97 percent (5.90 percent)
on a mean (median) loan amount of $862,542 ($100,000). 9

8

The direct measurement of loan interest rates rather than the use of an estimated average cost of debt measure
inferred from the income statement and balance sheet avoids measurement concerns such as identifying liabilities that are
contracted at arm’s length and staleness caused by loan maturities greater than one year. These concerns are exacerbated
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3.2.2. Accrual Accounting Use. Our accrual accounting indicator is obtained from the
question: “Did the business use cash or accrual accounting to prepare its financial records for the
fiscal year ending [DATE]?” The survey defined cash and accrual accounting as follows:
The distinction between the cash basis of accounting and the accrual basis of
accounting lies in the time at which revenues and expenses are recognized. Under
cash basis accounting, revenue is recorded when payment is collected from the
customer, rather than when a sale is actually made. Under accrual basis accounting,
however, revenue is recorded at the time of the sale even if cash has not yet been
collected.
Similarly, expenses are recorded under cash basis when payment is made, rather than
when related goods or services are used. Expenses are recognized when the related
goods or services are used, rather than when payment is made, under the accrual basis
of accounting.
For example, for a business with a fiscal year ending December 31st, interest incurred
for the month of December will be recorded as an expense under the accrual basis of
accounting, even if payment is not made until the following year. Under the cash
basis, however, interest incurred but not paid is not recognized as an expense.
If respondents were uncertain about their use of cash or accrual accounting, they were referred
to the relevant box in their tax returns requiring them to indicate whether they used cash or accrual
accounting when completing their tax forms. Thirty-six percent of our sample reported using accrual
accounting. The variable Accrual equals one if the firm used accrual accounting, and zero otherwise.
Importantly, this measure of accounting sophistication is not based on the empirical properties of
accounting numbers, but on the underlying technology for computing and reporting financial
information to the firm’s financers, thereby avoiding concerns that it is capturing firm or industry
characteristics that can cause common earnings-based accruals proxies to erroneously exhibit greater
accounting “quality” in some situations (Beyer et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2010).

when examining smaller, private firms (Cassar, 2010) and can result in significant noise in an inferred cost of debt
measure.
9

A minority of studies that have investigated the association between the cost of debt and accounting quality and
sophistication have specified the cost of debt variable as the difference between the interest rate on the loan and the prime
rate (e.g., Blackwell, Noland, and Winters, 1998). To examine whether our findings are robust to this specification, we
adopt this alternative cost of debt variable and remove prime rate as a control variable from our interest rate model. In
unreported results, all findings are consistent using this alternative cost of debt measure.
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3.2.3. Credit Scores. The Federal Reserve Board purchased credit scores for the respondents’
businesses from Dun & Bradstreet.

Like most third-party credit scoring methods, the Dun &

Bradstreet small business commercial credit scores are based on information regarding the firm’s
historical and current payment behavior, other publicly-available data that may influence loan
payment delinquency (e.g., liens or open lawsuits), business demographics, and (when provided by
the potential borrower) financial strength and performance. The scores range from 0 (highest risk) to
100 (lowest risk). In our sample, the mean (median) Credit score is 58.97 (63.00).
3.2.4. Relationship Banking. We assess the influence of relationship banking on interest rates
using the variable Relationship, which equals the log of the number of years the firm had conducted
business with the lending institution at the time of the most recently approved loan application plus
one. 10

Following prior studies (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994), we assume that information

asymmetries are lower when the firm has conducted business with the lending institution for a longer
period of time. The number of years the firm has conducted business with the lending institution
ranges from 0 to 79 years (mean = 8.85; median = 5.50).
3.2.5. Control Variables. Several variables are used to control for other potential determinants
of loan denial and interest rates. 11 These variables are drawn from earlier research on small business
lending (e.g., Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 2002; Allee and Yohn, 2009).
Control variables from the SSBF include firm leverage, size, use of collateral, and loan characteristics
such as loan type (e.g., line of credit, capital lease, vehicle loan), amount, and whether the loan’s
10

The survey does not provide information on the length of banking relationships for denied loans. As a result,
we are unable to examine the effect of relationship length on the availability of debt.
11

Several of the independent control variables used in our tests are financial ratios based on accounting values.
The use of these ratios is consistent with previous SSBF-based research. However, the accounting values may be a
function of the firm’s accounting methods, potentially altering the financial ratios in a systematic manner (Guenther,
Maydew, and Nutter, 1997). To address this potential limitation, we replaced all measures based on total assets (such as
the log of total assets and cash-to-assets) with measures based on the number of employees. Further, we removed
financial ratios that rely on accounting profits. All of the study’s inferences remain after reducing reliance on accounting
values for our independent variables.
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interest rate is fixed or floating. These data are supplemented with information from Federal Reserve
Reports, namely: 1) Prime rate, which equals the prime rate at the start of the loan; 2) Duration
spread, defined as the difference between a Baa bond and yield on 10-year treasury bonds at the time
of the loan; and 3) Term premium, which equals the difference between the yield on a government
bond with similar maturity and the yield on a treasury bill at the start of the loan. If the loan does not
have a fixed maturity, the term premium equals zero. 12
3.3. Correlations
Table 3 provides correlations between variables measuring the expected determinants of loan
denial in Panel A and interest rates in Panel B. Most or all of the control variables are significantly
correlated with the two loan variables, and their signs are consistent with previous research. Accrual
has a small but significant correlation (p < 0.05) with Credit score, and a significant, negative
correlation with loan denial and interest rates (p < 0.01). Relationship is negatively correlated with
interest rates (p < 0.01) and positively correlated with Credit score (p < 0.01), but is not significantly
associated with Accrual.

4. RESULTS
4.1. Econometric Issues

12

The selection of control variables was based on their observed effect on loan denial and interest rate reported
by research using previous SSBF survey data. We also estimated our models using a large number of other control
variables. In the loan denial models, these included the log of employment, owners’ education, owners’ years of
experience, whether the firm was owner-managed, indicators for the owners’ gender and race, sales scope, distance
between borrower and lender, banking concentration, and corporate form. We estimated the interest rate models after
including additional variables for region, year, log of employment, rural location, education, years experience, whether
the firm is owner-managed, log of firm age, sales scope, whether the firm has a checking (savings) account with the
lender, type of financial institution, if the firm was previously denied a loan, length of relationship and distance from
lender, whether a guarantee was used, type of collateral, inverse of loan maturity, loan fees, percentage to close loan, sales
growth, asset turnover, profit margin, return on assets, firm and owner bankruptcy and judgment, banking concentration,
and corporate form. Since the results vary little using these additional control variables, and their inclusion substantially
reduces sample sizes in our tests due to missing data, they are not included in the reported models to simplify
presentation.
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Two important econometric issues in our study are the endogenous choice of accounting
sophistication and the self-selection of firms that decide to apply for a loan.
4.1.1. Endogeneity. The level of accounting sophistication is a choice variable for the firm.
Endogeneity in this choice is an important issue because many factors that influence this decision are
also likely to influence lending decisions, potentially leading to correlated omitted variables
problems. We therefore supplement our accrual accounting variable with a variable that attempts to
control for endogeneity issues.
Addressing endogeneity requires instrumental variables that are correlated with the use of
accrual accounting but are uncorrelated with errors in the loan denial or interest rate models. We use
two variables to instrument accrual accounting use: 1) the presence of accounts receivable (coded one
if credit is provided to customers and zero otherwise), and 2) industry days in inventory (defined as
the average days of inventory for companies in the firm’s two-digit SIC code, as reported in
Compustat for firms with less than $5 million in revenues). We use an indicator variable for the
presence of accounts receivable rather than the value of these accounts to minimize concerns that
larger accounts receivable can serve as collateral or be factored, thereby influencing lending
decisions. 13 Industry (rather than firm-specific) inventory levels are used to minimize concerns that
individual firms choose inventory levels to influence lending decisions. As the length of time
between economic events and their associated cash flows widens, the potential benefits from accrual
accounting and its revenue recognition and matching principles should increase (Dechow, 1994).
The presence of accounts receivable and increasing days in inventory should therefore lead to greater

13

Slightly fewer than two-thirds (63.9 percent) of firms having accounts receivable use accrual accounting.
Thus, the use accrual accounting and the presence of accounts receivable are not synonymous.

20

need for the firm to address these timing and matching problems, increasing the benefits from (and
the likelihood of accrual accounting use. 14
Table 4 provides results from probit models examining the exogenous determinants of
Accrual. The left-most columns display results using the instruments alone, while the right-most
columns display results with the instruments and the other predicted exogenous variables for the
denial model (results using interest rate controls not reported to simplify presentation). In both
models, the presence of accounts receivable and days in inventory have significant, positive
associations with accrual use (p < 0.01, two-tailed).
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) argue that only under certain conditions will 2SLS provide
results superior to OLS.

We evaluate these conditions and the validity of our instruments by

examining the partial R2s and partial F-statistics of our instruments when included in models with all
other exogenous variables. The partial R2 is 0.054 and partial F-statistic is 36.88 (p < 0.0001) for
loan denial, while the partial R2 is 0.046 and partial F-statistic is 28.49 (p < 0.0001) for interest rate.
In both models, the instruments’ incremental explanatory power is statistically significant and above
the recommended magnitudes for adopting our instruments in a 2SLS specification (Stock, Wright,
and Yogo, 2002). These results not only support the use of our instrumented accrual accounting
variable in subsequent tests, but also provide evidence of the convergent validity of our accounting
choice measure.
4.1.2. Self-Selection. Another important econometric issue in the loan denial tests is the fact
that only a subset of firms in the survey applied for debt financing. Self-selection may affect
statistical inferences because the choice to apply for financing is truncated (i.e., firms that decided not
14

Another potential instrument for the use of accrual accounting is the presence of accounts payable. We do not
use this as an instrument because it represents trade credit, a potential indicator of credit worthiness. When we include an
indicator for the presence of accounts payable in the accounting method prediction model, it is positive and significant.
Results are invariant to using alternative predicted accounting sophistication variables that incorporate accounts payable.
All findings utilizing instrumental variables are also invariant to using only the presence of accounts receivable or only
industry days in inventory as instruments.
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to apply are excluded) and may be correlated with other factors associated with loan acceptance or
denial, potentially leading to biased parameter estimates. Heckman (1976) proposes a two-step
process to account for selection biases. In the first stage, the self-selection decision is modeled using
a dichotomous choice method such as logit or probit. The resulting inverse Mills ratio is then used as
an additional explanatory variable in the second-stage model to control for selection biases.
We model the firm’s decision to apply for a loan as a function of several variables expected to
influence the entity’s demand for debt capital. These variables include firm age, firm size (measured
using the log of total assets), ownership characteristics (the presence of an owner-manager and the
number of owners), cash needs (proxied using the cash-to-assets ratio), profitability (ROA), and
growth (sales growth over one and three year periods).
Results from the first-stage probit estimation are presented in Table 5. Firms applying for
loans tend to have more assets and owners, to be owner-managed, and to have lower cash-to-asset
ratios and stronger sales growth over the past year. We use the first-stage probit estimate to obtain
the inverse Mills ratio for the loan application decision, and then include this ratio in the second-stage
loan denial estimates to account for self-selection in loan applications (Amemiya, 1985).
4.2. Determinants Of Loan Acceptance Or Denial
Our first tests examine the determinants of loan acceptance or denial. Table 6 provides results
from these probit models. 15 Since the dependent variable is an indicator representing whether the

15

The SSBF provides imputed data for most missing values in the original survey, with the imputed data
provided in the publicly available datasets in five implicates. In our tests, all imputed data are classified as missing. We
re-estimated the models using actual or imputed data for all observations with non-imputed values for the primary
dependent variables (accrual accounting, credit score, relationship, loan denial, and interest rate). Results using imputed
data are consistent with those reported in the tables, suggesting that missing value biases are not driving our results. Our
analyses are also performed using unweighted econometric techniques. However, the SSBF is constructed from a
stratified random sample based on firm size, geographic region, and urbanization. Sample weights are provided to allow
parameter estimates to be based on the population of firms in the SSBF’s sampling frame. We repeated the analyses using
weighted least squares based on the sample weights provided in the SSBF. Findings using weighted analyses are
consistent with the reported findings, with the primary difference being statistically and economically stronger
associations between information sources and interest rates.
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firm was denied debt in the past three years, only those firms that applied for loans are included in
these analyses. The primary variables of interest in these tests are the “hard” information provided by
accounting reports and the firm’s credit score. We also control for factors that previous research
suggests are determinants of small business loan acceptance or denial, including firm size and age,
profitability, leverage, and previous credit history. The inverse Mills ratio is included to control for
self-selection in the decision to apply for a loan.
When we estimate the model using the uninstrumented Accrual measure, the coefficient on
this variable is negative but statistically insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient on Credit score is
negative and highly significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed). These results suggest that higher credit scores
increase the probability that a small business receives a loan, but that the use of accrual accounting
has no effect on this decision.
To examine whether accrual accounting and credit scores are complements or substitutes, we
add the interaction between these two variables. For example, the benefits from accrual accounting
may be greater for firms with lower credit scores, and vice versa. Alternatively, any benefits from
accrual accounting may be higher when this method is combined with high credit scores since the
information provided by one source may be used to validate the information provided by the other.
Despite these conjectures, the interaction term is not significant, while Credit score remains
significant and Accrual remains insignificant.
Results are similar when we replace Accrual with the instrumented use of accrual accounting
(denoted Accrual_hat) to control for endogeneity in the choice to use this accounting method. We
adjust the standard errors in these tests to account for Accrual_hat being an estimate. The coefficients
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on Credit score continue to be negative and significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed), while the coefficients
on Accrual_hat and the interaction term are not statistically significant. 16
Coefficient signs on the control variables are generally consistent with expectations, with firm
size and firm age significantly reducing the probability of loan denial, and firm leverage and previous
delinquencies significantly increasing loan denial probability. Self-selection in the firms choosing to
apply for a loan (Inverse Mills ratio) is a significant predictor of loan denial (p < 0.01, two-tailed),
indicating that the factors that increase the probability a firm applies for a loan also reduce the
likelihood that the loan will be denied.
In sum, we find no evidence that the use of accrual accounting methods influences the
probability that a small business’s loan is approved or denied. Instead, our results suggest that credit
scores, which provide a relatively low-cost method to quickly assess small business repayment
probability, are more likely to be used by lenders to make the initial decision to accept or deny a loan
application. 17
4.3. Interest Rates Determinants
We next examine the factors influencing the interest rates on small business loans, given the
lender’s decision to grant the loan. These tests are limited to respondents who received a loan in the
past three years and provided the interest rate on the latest loan. Results from these tests are provided
in Table 7. The models’ R2s range from 0.185 to 0.191, similar to or larger than the magnitudes in
other small business interest rate studies (e.g., Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1994,
2002; Allee and Yohn, 2009; Kim et al., 2007). The signs on the control variables are generally
16

Ai and Norton (2003) note that the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term in a dichotomous model need
not be the same statistical significance or sign as the marginal effect for each observation. To investigate this concern, we
investigate these marginal effects. Using model 2, 68.7 percent of the individual marginal effects are positive, with none
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Using model 4, 53.8 percent of the individual marginal effects are positive, with
only two statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Overall, these results corroborate the insignificant associations between
the interaction term and loan denial in Table 6.
17

As noted earlier, the SSBF survey does not provide information on the length of banking relationships when
loans were denied. As a result, we are unable to examine the association between relationship length and loan denial.
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consistent with expectations, with leverage and fixed rate loans positively related to interest rates, and
loan amount negatively associated with interest rates.
In contrast to the loan denial tests, the coefficients on the uninstrumented Accrual measure are
negative and significant. The coefficient on Accrual in the first model suggests that the use of
accrual accounting reduces interest rates by 37.3 basis points, which is equivalent to 6.2 percent of
the mean interest rate in the sample. 18 Credit score and Relationship on the other hand, have no
significant effects on interest rates in the first model. Models 2, 3, 4 include two-way multiplicative
interactions between (1) Accrual and Credit score, (2) Accrual and Relationship, and (3) Credit score
and Relationship, respectively, to investigate potential complementarities or substitutions between
these alternative information sources. We examine separate two-way interactions and do not include
a three-way multiplicative interaction in these tests because the inclusion of higher order
multiplicative interactions using the same variables as those used for the main and lower order
interaction effects increases a regression model’s susceptibility to multicollinearity problems.
When the interaction between Accrual and Credit score is included as an additional predictor
variable, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant and the coefficient on the
Credit score main effect is negative and significant. The differing signs on the Accrual and Credit
score main effect variables relative to the interaction term imply that these two information sources
are substitutes. That is, firms with lower (higher) credit scores receive greater (smaller) interest rate
benefits from accrual accounting. For example, the interest rate benefit from accrual accounting for a

18

In economic terms, the benefit from accrual accounting for the mean (median) loan amount of $831,262
($100,000) in the interest rate sample is $3,100.61 ($373), and the total benefit from accrual accounting for the mean
(median) total debt of $1,938,170 ($251,500) is $7,229.37 ($938). It should be noted that the benefits and incentives to
use accrual accounting and other more sophisticated accounting methods are not confined to debt contracting. For
example, Cassar (2009) argues that firms’ accounting sophistication can be driven by many influences including
contracting demands within the firm, decision-making and performance evaluation requirements, firm competition and
price pressures, and manager’s knowledge and experience. Therefore, the choice to use accrual accounting is not solely a
function of the benefits obtained from expected changes in a firm’s cost of debt.
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firm with a credit score at the 25th percentile is 62 basis points (-1.004 + 0.010 × 38), 37 basis points
at the median credit score, and only 12 basis points at a credit score at the 75th percentile.
Similarly, in Model 4 the interaction between Credit score and Relationship is positive and
significant while the coefficient on Relationship is negative and significant, consistent with Credit
score and Relationship being substitute information sources.

In Model 3, the interaction term

between Accrual and Relationship is also positive but is not statistically significant.
Model 5 presents the model with all three interactions included. The maximum VIF for this
specification is 9.03, slightly below the threshold of 10 or higher denoting unacceptable
multicollinearity (Kennedy 2003). The main and interaction effects are generally consistent with the
models including only one interaction at a time. 19 To provide evidence on the economic significance
of the substitution effects, Panel A of Table 8 presents the estimated benefits from using accrual
accounting based on the quartile of credit score and relationship length. The estimated benefit of
accrual accounting is decreasing in both credit score and relationship length. For example, Panel A
indicates that the benefit from accrual accounting for a firm with both a credit score and a
relationship length at the 25th percentile is 70.3 basis points (-1.196 + 0.010 × 38 + 0.245 × 0.45), but
only 3.2 basis points when both the credit score and relationship length are at the 75th percentile.
Untabulated results are similar when Accrual_hat is used to control for endogeneity in the use
of accrual accounting (with standard errors corrected for this variable being estimated).

The

coefficients are significantly negative on the Accrual_hat, Credit score, and Relationship main
effects (p < 0.10, two-tailed). Coefficient signs on the interaction terms are consistent with those
using Accrual. However, the interactions between the instrumented accrual measure and credit

19

To examine the potential influence of selection biases on these inferences, we repeated the analyses using the
inverse Mills ratios for firms that: 1) recently applied for debt financing; and 2) recently obtained debt financing.
Coefficients on both inverse Mills ratios were statistically insignificant, while the coefficients and statistical significance
of the accrual accounting, credit score, relationship length, and interaction variables were similar, suggesting that our
interest rate results are not driven by selection biases.
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scores and between credit scores and relationship length are marginally insignificant at conventional
levels (p = 0.16 and 0.11, two-tailed, respectively), and the interaction between Accrual_hat and
Relationship is not significant. Panel B of Table 8 shows the estimated economic benefit from
(instrumented) accrual accounting for a firm with both a credit score and a relationship length at the
25th percentile is 61 basis points (-0.815 + 0.005 × 38 + -0.004 × 0.45), and 34 basis points at a credit
score and relationship length at the 75th percentile. These results again suggest that the benefits of
accrual accounting on interest rates are lower when the entity’s credit score is higher, but no longer
provide evidence of a tradeoff between accrual accounting and relationship length on interest rates.
4.4. Alternative Interaction Specifications
The preceding interest rate tests assume very specific linear relationships and multiplicative
interactions, and only consider the interactions between two of the three information sources at a
time. However, the influence of these alternative information sources on interest rates may vary
depending upon the quality of the information provided by both of the other sources, and the relations
between the individual information sources and their interactions need not have linear multiplicative
associations with interest rates.
We conduct two tests to investigate more complex interactions among the three information
sources. First, we partition the sample into two groups at the median lending relationship length. 20
The mean (median) relationship is 2.03 years (1.83 years) in the subsample of shorter relationships,
and 15.94 years (13.00 years) in the subsample of longer relationships.

We estimate separate

regressions of interest rates on Accrual, Credit score, their interaction, and the control variables for
each group. As shown in Table 9, we again find significant, positive coefficients (p < 0.10, twotailed) on the accrual and credit score main effects and a significant, negative coefficient on their
20

Partitioning our sample, rather than pooling all firms, allows the coefficients on all of the interest rate
predictors to vary across short and long banking relationships. In addition, partitioning minimizes the multicollinearity
problems that typically occur when a large number of multiplicative interactions are included in a regression model. A
disadvantage of partitioning is a potential loss in estimation efficiency.
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interaction term in the subsample of firms with shorter relationship lengths. However, Accrual is not
significant in firms with longer lending relationships. This evidence is consistent with claims that the
information provided by longer banking relationships subsumes any incremental information
provided by more sophisticated accounting information or third-party credit scores. However, when
lending relationships are relatively short, both accrual accounting and higher credit scores can serve
as (substitute) mechanisms for reducing information asymmetries with lenders. 21
Second, we replace the Accrual, Credit Score and Relationship variables and their associated
interactions with a series of indicator variables that classify firms based on whether they: 1) do or do
not use accrual accounting; 2) have a credit score above or below the sample median (63); and 3)
have a relationship with the lending institution longer or shorter than the sample median (5.5 years).
Panel A of Table 10 reports the number of firms in each combination of accrual accounting, credit
score, and relationship length, as well as the results from the regression of interest rates on indicators
for these combinations and the control variables. The (omitted) base case in the model is the group of
firms that does not use accrual accounting, has relatively low credit scores, and relatively short
lending relationships. The statistically significant negative coefficients (p < 0.01) on the seven
indicator variables imply that the highest interest rates are found in the base case of firms in the no
accrual, low credit score, and short relationship category, indicating that information asymmetries are
highest in these firms.
To provide evidence on the associations between interest rates and the other firm groupings,
Panel B of Table 10 presents Wald tests of the joint statistical significance of Accrual, Credit Score,

21

We conduct similar analyses after partitioning by credit score (using the sample median) or by accrual use. For
each of these specifications, we find statistically negative associations between the two remaining information sources
and interest rates for firms with lower credit scores or the non-use of accrual accounting, and no association between
relationship length, accrual use, or credit scores in firms with higher credit score or accrual accounting. These results are
consistent with the main specifications which suggest that the benefits from accrual use, higher credit scores, and longer
relationships are primarily found in firms that are weaker in the other information dimensions.
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and Relationship for the various combinations. Consistent with the earlier specifications, Accrual has
an overall significant effect on interest rates (F = 3.59, p = 0.0064). However, when we subdivide
the sample by credit score and relationship length, we only find a significant Accrual effect in firms
with credit scores below the sample median (F = 7.10, p = 0.0009) or relationships shorter than the
sample median (F = 6.88, p = 0.0011). We find no significant accrual effect in firms with higher
credit scores or longer relationships.

Moreover, when firms are further categorized by the

combination of credit score and relationship length, accrual accounting is only significantly
associated with interest rates in firms having both low credit scores and short relationships (F =
13.75, p = 0.0002), with accrual accounting estimated to reduce this group of firms’ cost of debt by
132 basis points. These results imply that the interest rate benefits from accrual accounting are
limited to firms that do not have alternative means for reducing information asymmetries.
The Wald tests for Credit Score and Relationship exhibit similar findings, with the only
statistically significant interest rate benefits from these information sources confined to the subgroups of firms that do not use accrual accounting or have relatively low scores on the other
information source.

Specifically, Credit score has a significant effect in non-accrual, short

relationship firms (F = 12.94, p = 0.0003), and Relationship has a significant effect in non-accrual,
low credit score firms (F = 8.94, p = 0.0036). Overall, the evidence from the classification-based
specifications implies that firms receive little if any interest rate benefits from improving a given
information source if they are already relatively strong in one of the alternative information sources. 22
4.5. Alternative Accounting Sophistication Measures
Accrual accounting is only one indicator of accounting sophistication. Prior small and private
business studies indicate that factors such as the preparation of financial statements and audits can
22

In unreported results, we further subdivided the sample into groups based on accrual use and sample terciles
for credit scores and length of relationship, respectively. Results are consistent with those using the classifications
reported in the tables, with the alternative information sources only having significant effects on interest rates when the
values for the other information sources were lowest.
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also influence loan application outcomes (e.g., Allee and Yohn, 2009, Minnis, 2010; Kim et al.,
2007). We therefore compute a second, more comprehensive, accounting sophistication variable to
examine the influence of these other accounting system attributes on our results. AccSophistication is
the sum of indicators for three accounting practices: (1) accrual rather than cash accounting; (2) the
preparation of financial statements (defined as a balance sheet and income statement); and (3) the use
of audited financial statements. These indicators represent generally-accepted accounting principles
that have been advocated by proponents of improved small business accounting (e.g., AICPA/FASB,
2006; IASB, 2007). The financial statement and audit indicators are based on questions asking
whether respondents used financial statements to answer the financial questions in the survey and, if
so, whether the financial statements were audited by a professional accountant or accounting firm. 23
The resulting AccSophistication variable ranges from 0 (no use of accrual accounting, financial
statements, or audited financial statements) to 3 (use of all three practices), with a mean (median)
score of 0.63 (0.00).
Untabulated results using AccSophistication (or an instrumented AccSophistication_hat
variable) are weaker than those using the accrual measures. In economic terms, the benefit of
increasing the AccSophistication (AccSophistication_hat) score by 1 practice is 20 (120) basis points
for a firm with both a credit score and relationship length at the 25th percentile, and -7 (66) basis
points with a credit score and relationship length at the 75th percentile.

When we replace

AccSophistication with separate variables for accruals, financial statements, and audits, the financial
statement and audit indicators add no statistically significant exploratory power (p < 0.10) in any of
the reported specifications, while the accrual results remain similar to those reported in the tables.

23

A potential limitation with the financial statement and audit indicators is that using financial statements to
answer the survey does not necessarily indicate whether the firm prepares financial statements, since respondents can
prepare financial statements but rely on other information (such as tax forms, bank statements, etc.) for their survey
responses. If this is true for many respondents, our AccSophistication variable will not fully reflect the use of these more
sophisticated accounting practices.

30

This evidence suggests that our findings are not driven by the choice to calculate AccSophistication
as a linear sum of the three components of accounting sophistication. These findings also suggest
that our results are predominantly driven by the use of accrual accounting. 24
4.6. The Moderating Role of Collateral
We next partition our analysis by whether or not the firm pledged collateral for the loan. As
discussed earlier, economic theories argue that collateral can be used to reduce adverse selection by
acting as a sorting mechanism since only higher quality borrowers will be willing to pledge their
assets (i.e., reducing adverse selection problems), or lowering moral hazard problems by providing
incentives for borrowers to provide greater effort or abstain from shifting borrowed funds from
lower-risk to higher-risk projects. Consistent with these theories, Bharath et al. (2009) find that the
incentives to pledge collateral are strongest for the informational opaque, such as those with short
lending relationships. If borrowers can reduce interest rates by pledging collateral rather than by
reducing information asymmetries through the provision of more sophisticated accounting
information (or through higher credit scores or longer banking relationships), then the benefits from
accrual accounting should be lower on loans with collateral.
Consistent with this prediction, untabulated regression models show an accrual accounting
benefit of -0.607 (p = 0.04, two-tailed) in firms that did not pledge collateral and -0.199 (p = 0.29) in
those pledging collateral. When we include multiplicative interaction terms in these models, the
results continue to indicate that the benefits from accrual accounting are decreasing in both credit
scores and relationship length, but that any benefits are lower or nonexistent in firms that pledge
collateral. For example, the benefit from accrual accounting for a firm not pledging (pledging)
collateral and having a credit score and relationship length at the 25th percentile is 103 (39) basis
points, and 21 (0) basis points at a credit score and relationship length at the 75th percentile.
24

We repeated our analyses using two other dichotomous variables representing the other levels of auditor
association (review and compilation). The results are consistently weaker using this specification.
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The finding that collateral reduces any interest rate benefits from accrual accounting is
reinforced when we estimate the models using categorical variables for accrual use or non-use, credit
scores below or above the median, and relationship lengths above or below the median, thereby
allowing for nonlinearities. As shown in Table 11, we find no significant differences in interest rate
across the various classifications or their interactions in the subsample of loans with collateral. In
contrast, accrual use has a significant, positive main effect on interest rates in loans without
collateral, but any significant accrual accounting benefit in this subsample is again limited to
borrowers with low credit scores and/or short relationship lengths. This evidence supports theories
that contractual characteristics such as collateral can substitute for higher quality information when
addressing information asymmetries in lending decisions.
4.7. Other Moderating Factors
The debt literature suggests that the age of the borrower’s firm and its legal liability can also
influence the level of information asymmetries.

We examine the influence of firm age by

partitioning our sample into firms that are younger or older than the sample median (15 years).
Information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders are argued to be decreasing in firm age
(Diamond 1989; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Minnis, 2010).

As information on firms becomes

increasingly available over time, the value of greater accounting sophistication and longer lending
relationships for reducing information asymmetries may decline as credit scores and other external
information sources reflect a larger information set.

In untabulated tests, we find an accrual

accounting interest rate benefit of -0.642 in younger firms (p = 0.03, two-tailed) and an insignificant 0.180 (p = 0.35) in older firms, consistent with the benefits of accounting sophistication being greater
for younger firms. We also find a significantly negative association between credit scores and
interest rates in older firms (β = -0.006, p = 0.04) but not in younger firms, consistent with credit
scores becoming more informative as they incorporate more firm history.
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Inclusion of the interaction terms reveals that the interest rate benefits from accrual
accounting are decreasing in credit scores and relationship length, but only in younger firms. For
example, the estimated benefit from accrual accounting in a firm younger than the sample median
and with a credit score and relationship length at the 25th percentile is 129 basis points relative to a
younger firm with a credit score and relationship length at the 75th percentile. However, there are no
significant interaction effects in older firms, suggesting that the interest rate benefits from accrual
accounting are primarily in younger firms with relatively low credit scores and short lending
relationships.
Second, we partition our sample by the firm’s legal liability. Avery et al. (1998) argue that
reducing information asymmetries is more important for lenders to limited liability firms since the
borrowers’ personal wealth is protected in the case of default. Consistent with this hypothesis, Allee
and Yohn (2009) find that the use of accrual-based financial statements is associated with lower
interest rates in small businesses with limited liability, but find no interest rate benefit in businesses
with unlimited liability. Similarly, when we estimate interest rate models without the interaction
terms, we find no significant benefit from accrual accounting (p = 0.33, two-tailed) in unlimited
liability firms but a significant -0.379 rate reduction (p = 0.04) in limited liability firms (not reported
in the tables).

However, when we include the interaction terms, accrual accounting and its

interactions become significant in both subsamples. In both limited and unlimited liability firms, the
interest rate benefits from accrual accounting are again decreasing in both credit scores and
relationship length. For example, the benefit from accrual accounting in an unlimited (limited)
liability firm with a credit score and a relationship length at the 25th percentile differs by 128 (64)
basis points from a firm with a credit score and relationship length at the 75th percentile. Thus, once
the alternative information sources are incorporated into the analyses, accrual accounting exhibits
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potential interest rate benefits regardless of the borrowers’ legal liability, with greater benefits in
unlimited liability firms.
Our analyses of the influence of firm age and legal liability continue to support the finding
that the use of accrual accounting can provide interest rate benefits, but that any benefits from this
more sophisticated accounting method is decreasing in the firm’s credit score and relationship length.
However, the results also suggest that firm age and legal liability moderate the relation between the
various information sources (and their interactions) and interest rates.

5. CONCLUSIONS
This study examines whether accrual accounting, third-party credit scores, and the “soft”
information provided by relationship banking interact to reduce information asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders, thereby increasing the firm’s access to debt and lowering the firm’s interest
rate. We investigate this question using a large, representative sample of small, privately-held firms.
The small firm setting has the advantage of having fewer competing information sources and no
mandatory accounting practices that may affect observed associations between accounting
sophistication and lending decisions. In contrast to prior small business lending studies, we provide
evidence on whether alternative “hard” and “soft” information sources (accrual accounting, thirdparty credit scores, and relationship banking) are substitute means for reducing information
asymmetries. In doing so, our study informs regulators and practitioners, as well as extending prior
studies on the relative informativeness of accounting sophistication to the capital markets.
We find little evidence that accrual accounting reduces the likelihood of loan denial; however,
higher credit scores are negatively associated with loan denial, suggesting that the information
contained in these scores is used in the initial decision to accept or deny the application, while the
incremental information from accrual accounting has little influence on this decision. In contrast, we
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find accrual accounting is negatively associated with the initial interest rate on approved loans,
consistent with firm provided accounting reducing information asymmetries between lenders and
borrowers.
Examining the complementary or substitutability between accounting sophistication (in our
case accrual accounting), soft information, and third party credit scores on the borrower’s cost of debt
suggests that these alternative information sources are substitute means for assessing borrower risk
and determining interest rates. We show that any interest rate benefits from accrual accounting in
small firms is contingent on (diminishing in) the length of their existing banking relationships and
publicly available creditworthiness. Further analyses suggest that accrual accounting only has a
significant influence on interest rates in firms that have weak credit scores and short relationships
with their lender, and vice versa.

Moreover, any interest rate benefits from the alternative

information sources appear to be eliminated when the borrower pledges collateral, supporting
economic theories that collateral provides an alternative mechanism to deal with information
asymmetries in lending decisions. Further examination of contingency factors suggests that firm age
and legal liability further moderate the influence of the various information sources (and their
interactions) on interest rates. Taken together, our findings suggest that although improvements in
financial accounting sophistication in this setting can be beneficial, it is likely to benefit only a subset
of small business borrowers and lenders.

Overall, our study demonstrates the importance of

evaluating the role of accounting information in the context of the firm’s overall information
environment, and of considering the role of debt contract characteristics when assessing the potential
benefits from more sophisticated accounting information in lending decisions.
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Table 1
Sample selection

Firms
Survey of Small Business Finances sample
Minus
Firms with non-positive assets, sales, shareholders
Publicly traded firms
Corporations (other than S) with annual receipts above $5 million
Respondents with missing accounting choice
Firms available for analysis

4,240

Firms that recently applied for debt financing
Minus
Respondents with missing responses to any independent variable
Sample used in loan denial analysis

1,402

Firms with recent debt financing
Minus
Respondents with missing interest rate
Respondents with missing responses to any independent variable
Sample used in interest rate analysis

1,309

41

508
5
351
83
3,293

17
1,385

88
30
1,191

Table 2
Descriptive statistics and variable definitions

Panel A: Descriptive statistics, full sample
Variable
Accrual
Credit score
Log total assets
Owner manager
Log number of owners
Family owned
Corporation
Cash to assets
Firm age
Sales growth (1 year)
Sales growth (3 years)
Trade credit
Accounts receivable
Apply

N
3,293
3,271
3,290
3,272
3,293
3,290
3,293
3,211
3,265
3,274
3,247
3,293
3,293
3,293

Mean
0.36
58.97
5.17
0.92
0.22
0.85
0.59
0.24
15.90
0.43
0.47
0.69
0.61
0.43

Std. dev.
0.48
29.55
1.02
0.28
0.29
0.36
0.49
0.29
11.84
0.50
0.50
0.46
0.49
0.50

First quartile
0.00
38.00
4.49
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.03
7.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Median
0.00
63.00
5.16
1.00
0.30
1.00
1.00
0.12
14.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

Third quartile
1.00
88.00
5.89
1.00
0.30
1.00
1.00
0.36
23.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Mean
0.11
0.49
59.20
5.64
0.66
4.86
0.87
16.86
0.01
0.05
0.08
0.20

Std. dev.
0.31
0.50
29.78
0.90
1.83
7.08
1.08
12.35
0.12
0.21
0.27
0.40

First quartile
0.00
0.00
38.00
5.03
0.01
1.42
0.28
8.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Median
0.00
0.00
63.00
5.67
0.15
2.84
0.60
15.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Third quartile
0.00
1.00
88.00
6.27
0.57
5.00
0.97
23.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Std. dev.
2.81
0.50
29.34
0.46
0.74
0.42
0.95
0.99
0.50
0.89
0.80
0.50
0.44

First quartile
4.50
0.00
38.00
0.45
4.00
2.11
0.00
0.28
0.00
5.08
4.48
0.00
0.00

Median
5.90
1.00
63.00
0.81
4.22
2.28
0.00
0.59
0.00
5.70
5.00
1.00
1.00

Third quartile
7.00
1.00
88.00
1.14
4.58
2.68
1.00
0.95
1.00
6.32
5.60
1.00
1.00

Panel B: Descriptive statistics, denial sample
Variable
Denied
Accrual
Credit score
Log total assets
Return on assets
Asset turnover
Debt to assets
Firm age
Bankrupt
Judgment
Personal delinquency
Firm delinquency

N
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385
1,385

Panel C: Descriptive statistics, interest rate sample
Variable
Interest rate
Accrual
Credit score
Relationship
Prime rate
Duration spread
Term premium
Debt to assets
Fixed rate
Log total assets
Log amount
Collateral
Primary institution

N
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191

Mean
5.97
0.50
60.70
0.78
4.39
2.41
0.60
0.82
0.49
5.69
5.09
0.53
0.74
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Panel D: Variable definitions
Variables

Description

Accounts receivable
Accrual
Apply

An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm records sales on account, zero otherwise
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm uses accrual accounting, zero otherwise
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm applied for a loan in the previous three
years, zero otherwise
Asset turnover a
Sales divided by total assets
Bankrupt
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm or owner declared bankruptcy in the past
seven years, zero otherwise
Cash to assets a
Total cash divided by total assets
Collateral
An indicator variable taking the value of one if collateral is provided for the loan, zero otherwise
Corporation
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the entity was a corporation, zero otherwise
Credit score
Dun & Bradstreet credit score
Debt to assets a
Total debt divided by total assets
Denied
An indicator variable taking the value of one if firm was denied credit at least one in the last three
years, zero otherwise
Duration spread
Difference between Baa bond and yield on 10-year treasury bonds at the time of the loan
Family owned
An indicator variable taking the value of one if more than 50 percent of equity is owned by a single
family, zero otherwise
Firm age
Age of the firm in years
Firm delinquency
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm was delinquent on obligations one or more
times in the past three years, zero otherwise
Fixed rate
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the interest rate on the loan is fixed (rather than
variable), zero otherwise
Interest rate
Interest rate on most recent loan
Judgment
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm or owner has any judgments against it in
the past three years, zero otherwise
Log amount
Log 10 of the loan amount
Log number of owners Log 10 of the number of owners/partners/shareholders
Log total assets
Log 10 of the firm’s total assets
Owner manager
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is managed by an owner, zero otherwise
Personal delinquency An indicator variable taking the value of one if the owner was delinquent on personal obligations
one or more times in the past three years, zero otherwise
Primary institution
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the debt is obtained from the firm’s primary
financial institution, zero otherwise
Prime rate
The prime rate at the start of the loan
Relationship
Log 10 the number of years the firm had conducted business with the lending institution at the time
of the most recently approved loan application
Return on assets a
Profit divided by total assets
Sales growth (1 year) An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm’s total sales were greater than the previous
year, zero otherwise
Sales growth (3 years) An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm’s total sales were greater than three years
earlier, zero otherwise
Trade credit
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm records purchases on account, zero
otherwise
Term premium
Difference between yield on government bond with similar maturity and yield on treasury bill
a

Ratios winsorized at 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent.
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Table 3
Correlations
Panel A: Loan denial sample
Variable

Denied

Denied
Accrual
Credit score
Log total assets
Asset turnover
Return on assets
Debt to assets
Firm age
Bankrupt
Judgment
Personal delinquency
Firm delinquency

-0.10**
-0.10**
-0.24**
-0.16**
0.00
-0.01
0.12**
-0.13**
0.11**
0.14**
0.27**

Accrual

0.06*
0.45**
-0.12**
-0.15**
-0.04
0.07**
-0.07**
-0.04
-0.11**
0.08**

Credit score

0.12**
0.04
-0.02
-0.08**
0.16**
-0.12**
-0.11**
-0.20**
-0.33**

Log total
assets

-0.45**
-0.31**
-0.31**
-0.24**
-0.09**
-0.02
-0.16**
0.02

Asset
turnover

0.54**
0.41**
-0.05
-0.02
0.03
-0.01
-0.04

Return on
assets

Debt-toassets

0.17**
-0.02
0.01
-0.00
-0.02
-0.03

-0.13**
0.02
0.09**
0.07**
0.13**

Firm age

Bankrupt

Judgment

-0.01
-0.02
-0.10**
-0.03

0.09**
0.10**
0.05

0.28**
0.19**

Personal
delinquency

0.30**

Variables are defined in Table 2. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; n = 1,385
Panel B: Cost of debt sample
Variable
Interest rate
Accrual
Credit score
Relationship
Prime rate
Duration spread
Term premium
Debt to assets
Fixed rate
Log total assets
Log amount
Collateral
Primary institution

Interest
rate
-0.20**
-0.09**
-0.08**
0.06*
0.07*
0.15**
0.10**
0.27**
-0.31**
-0.33**
-0.12**
-0.07

Accrual

0.06*
0.03
-0.01
-0.03
-0.09**
-0.03
-0.10**
0.44**
0.36**
0.12**
0.14**

Credit score Relationship

0.11**
0.00
-0.02
-0.04
-0.08**
-0.04
0.10**
0.12**
-0.01
0.04

-0.02
-0.11**
-0.13**
-0.10**
-0.08**
0.14**
0.06*
-0.07*
0.34**

Prime
rate

Duration
spread

Term
premium

Debt-toassets

0.21**
-0.05
-0.04
0.12**
-0.04
-0.06
0.02
-0.04

0.09**
0.01
0.13**
-0.12**
-0.09**
0.07*
-0.05

-0.02
0.65**
-0.14**
-0.18**
0.10**
-0.19**

-0.03
-0.29**
-0.05
0.02
-0.01

Variables are defined in Table 2. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; n = 1,191
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Fixed rate

-0.26**
-0.39**
-0.04
-0.18**

Log total
assets

Log
amount

0.74**
0.20**
0.13**

0.30**
0.18**

Collateral

0.03

Table 4
Determinants of the use of accrual accounting

Instruments Only
Independent variables
Days in inventory
Accounts receivable
Log of total assets
Return on assets
Asset turnover
Debt to assets
Firm age
Bankrupt
Judgment
Personal delinquency
Firm delinquency
Credit score
Intercept
N
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2
χ2

Coefficient
0.003***
1.041***

-1.108***

All Exogenous Variables

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

0.001
0.051

0.002***
0.629***

0.001
0.059

0.046

0.671***
-0.007
0.015***
0.140***
-0.003
0.096
-0.188*
-0.188*
0.146*
0.000
-4.532***

0.035
0.014
0.004
0.025
0.002
0.185
0.133
0.100
0.076
0.001
0.198

3,292
-1913.13
.113
487.09***

3,197
-1603.85
.234
978.34***

Accrual = α + β1Days in inventory + β2Accounts receivable + β3Log of total assets +
β4Return on assets + β5Asset turnover + β6Debt to assets + β7Firm age + β8Bankrupt +
β9Judgment + β10Personal delinquency + β11Firm delinquency + β12Judgment +
β13Personal delinquency + β14Firm delinquency + β15Credit score
Table reports probit estimation. Dependent variable is coded one if the entity uses
accrual accounting, and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, *
denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 5
Determinants of applying for a loan

Independent variables

Coefficient

Log total assets
Owner manager
Log number of owners
Cash to assets
Return on assets
Firm age
Sales growth (1 year)
Sales growth (3 years)
Intercept

0.484***
0.202**
0.271***
-0.745***
0.006
-0.001
0.153***
0.043
-2.861***

N
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2
χ2

Std. error
0.033
0.089
0.099
0.103
0.012
0.002
0.056
0.056
0.203

3,090
-1,792.64
0.149
632.02

Apply = α + β1Log total assets + β2Owner manager + β3Log number of owners +
β4Cash to assets + β5Return on assets + β6Firm age + β7Sales growth (1 year)+ β8Sales
growth (3 years)
Table reports probit estimation. Dependent variable is coded one if the entity has
applied for a loan in the last three years, and zero otherwise. Independent variables are
defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (twotailed), respectively.
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Table 6
Determinants of loan denial

Model 1
Independent variables

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Coefficient

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

Accrual
Credit score
Accrual × Credit score
Accrual_hat
Accrual_hat × Credit score

-0.147
-0.010***

0.116
0.002

-0.067
-0.009***
-0.002

0.201
0.002
0.004

-0.009***

0.002

-0.011***

0.002

-0.608

0.444

-0.041
-0.004

0.214
0.003

Log of total assets
Return on assets
Asset turnover
Debt to assets
Firm age
Bankrupt
Judgment
Personal delinquency
Firm delinquency
Inverse mills ratio
Intercept

-0.689***
-0.029
-0.005
0.100**
-0.011**
0.456
0.138
0.651***
0.152
-1.373***
4.195***

-0.553***
-0.034
-0.001
0.117**
-0.011**
0.423
0.081
0.612***
0.202
-1.370***
3.906***

0.210
0.033
0.009
0.047
0.005
0.319
0.218
0.164
0.134
0.416
1.310

-0.584***
-0.026
-0.003
0.126**
-0.011**
0.496
0.127
0.641***
0.154
-1.435***
3.559***

0.198
0.033
0.009
0.052
0.005
0.319
0.215
0.159
0.136
0.426
1.350

N
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2
χ2

1,308
-370.40
0.183
166.19

0.167
0.033
0.009
0.046
0.005
0.319
0.213
0.157
0.130
0.422
1.207

-0.685***
-0.029
-0.005
0.101**
-0.011**
0.464
0.136
0.651***
0.146
-1.367***
4.141***
1,308
-370.28
0.184
166.42

0.167
0.033
0.009
0.046
0.005
0.319
0.212
0.156
0.131
0.422
1.211

1,307
-369.05
0.182
164.03

1,307
-368.35
0.184
165.88

Denial = α + β1Accrual + β2Credit score + β3Accrual×Credit score + β4Accrual_hat + β5Accrual_hat×Credit score + β6Log of total assets +
β7Return on assets + β8Asset turnover + β9Debt to assets + β10Firm age + β11Bankrupt + β12Judgment + β13Personal delinquency + β14Firm
delinquency + β15Inverse mills ratio
Table reports probit estimation. Dependent variable is coded one if the entity was denied credit on a loan application in the last three years, and
zero otherwise. Accrual_hat is an instrumental variable of voluntary accrual use is based on probit model from Table 4. Inverse mills ratio is
based on probit model for applying for a loan from Table 5. All remaining independent variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 7
Determinants of interest rates with interactions

Model 1
Independent variables

Coefficient

N
R2
F-stat
F-stat for interactions

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

0.168
0.003
0.176

-1.004***
-0.008**
-0.290*
0.010**

0.352
0.004
0.176
0.005

-0.664**
-0.003
-0.449*

0.305
0.003
0.239

-0.392**
-0.010**
-0.864**

0.169
0.005
0.381

0.010*

0.005

Accrual
-0.373**
-0.003
Credit score
-0.265
Relationship
Accrual × Credit score
Accrual × Relationship
Credit score × Relationship
Prime rate
Duration spread
Term premium
Debt to assets
Fixed rate
Log total assets
Log amount
Collateral
Primary institution
Intercept
Loan type indicators

Model 2

0.129
0.054
0.025
0.151*
1.205***
-0.150
-0.765***
-0.274*
0.119
10.089***
Yes
1,189
0.185
15.653

0.372

0.105
0.187
0.117
0.082
0.217
0.143
0.162
0.163
0.185
0.903

0.133
0.060
0.014
0.152*
1.222***
-0.152
-0.758***
-0.271*
0.125
10.345***
Yes

0.105
0.186
0.117
0.082
0.217
0.143
0.162
0.163
0.185
0.910

0.326

0.124
0.067
0.002
0.149*
1.204***
-0.152
-0.762***
-0.278*
0.136
10.230***
Yes

1,189
0.188
15.054

1,189
0.186
14.860

0.105
0.187
0.117
0.082
0.217
0.143
0.162
0.163
0.186
0.911

0.129
0.058
0.019
0.152*
1.205***
-0.147
-0.769***
-0.267
0.119
10.538***
Yes
1,189
0.187
14.985

0.105
0.186
0.117
0.082
0.216
0.143
0.162
0.163
0.185
0.937

Coefficient

Std. error

-1.196***
-0.015***
-0.995**
0.010**
0.245
0.009*

0.416
0.006
0.401
0.005
0.329
0.005

0.130
0.072
0.005
0.152*
1.225***
-0.151
-0.762***
-0.267
0.136
10.868***
Yes

0.105
0.187
0.117
0.082
0.216
0.143
0.162
0.163
0.185
0.948

1,189
0.191
13.761
2.661

Interest rate = α + β1Accrual + β2 Credit score + β3Relationship + β4Accrual×Credit score + β5Accrual×Relationship + β6Credit score×Relationship + β7 Prime rate +
β8Duration spread + β9Term premium + β10Debt to assets + β11Fixed rate + β12Log total assets + β13Log amount + β14Collateral + β15Primary institution
Table reports OLS estimation. Regression includes loan type fixed effects. Dependent variable is the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan. All variables are
defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 8
Effect of accrual accounting on interest rates by credit score and relationship length
Panel A: Estimation based on accrual accounting (Accrual) from Table 7, Model 5

Percentile

Relationship

25th
50th
75th

Value
0.45
0.81
1.14

25th
38
-0.703
-0.615
-0.534

Credit Score
50th
63
-0.452
-0.364
-0.283

75th
88
-0.201
-0.112
-0.032

Panel B: Estimation based on instrumented accrual accounting (Accrual_hat) use

Percentile

Relationship

25th
50th
75th

Value
0.45
0.81
1.14

25th
38
-0.609
-0.610
-0.611

Credit Score
50th
63
-0.472
-0.473
-0.474

75th
88
-0.335
-0.336
-0.337

Provides estimate of the effect of accrual accounting (β1 + β4 + β5) on the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan for
a given Credit score and Relationship based on the following OLS estimation model (Table 7, Model 5): Interest rate = α
+ β1Accrual + β2 Credit score + β3Relationship + β4Accrual×Credit score + β5Accrual×Relationship + β6Credit
score×Relationship + β7 Prime rate + β8Duration spread + β9Term premium + β10Debt to assets + β11Fixed rate + β12Log
total assets + β13Log amount + β14Collateral + β15Primary institution
Regression includes loan type fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table 2. The values provided with the percentiles
are based on sample percentiles of Relationship and Credit score for the cost of debt sample.
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Table 9
Determinants of interest rates partitioned by relationship length

Short Relationship

Long Relationship

Independent variables

Coefficient

Std. error

Accrual
Credit score
Accrual × Credit score

-1.647***
-0.017***
0.019**

0.537
0.006
0.008

-0.222
0.003
-0.0005

0.446
0.004
0.006

Relationship
Prime rate
Duration spread
Term premium
Debt to assets
Fixed rate
Log total assets
Log amount
Collateral
Primary institution
Intercept
Loan type indicators

-0.033
0.068
0.102
-0.175
0.103
1.703***
-0.174
-0.674***
-0.475*
-0.132
10.840***
Yes

0.072
0.167
0.296
0.181
0.126
0.348
0.230
0.260
0.268
0.269
1.437

-0.015*
0.162
0.052
0.203
0.166
0.772***
-0.138
-0.840***
-0.011
0.522**
9.534***
Yes

0.009
0.126
0.225
0.144
0.103
0.257
0.170
0.193
0.189
0.251
1.101

n
R2
F-stat

598
0.209
8.52***

Coefficient

Std. error

591
0.203
8.11***

Interest rate = α + β1Accrual + β2 Credit score + β3Accrual×Credit score +
β4Relationship + β5 Prime rate + β6Duration spread + β7Term premium + β8Debt to
assets + β9Fixed rate + β10Log total assets + β11Log amount + β12Collateral +
β13Primary institution
Table reports OLS estimation. Regression includes loan type fixed effects. Dependent
variable is the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan. Entities are partitioned by
whether the years with their financiers is greater or less than the sample median
respectively. All remaining independent variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, *
denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 10
Determinants of interest rates using indicator variables

Independent variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual

Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N

×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×

Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score

H
L
H
L
H
L
H
L

×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×

Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship

L
L
S
S
L
L
S
S

N

Coefficient

Std. error

230
73
196
98
184
104
187
119

-1.175***
-1.334***
-1.171***
-1.326***
-0.995***
-1.016***
-1.088***
--

0.315
0.396
0.316
0.358
0.308
0.349
0.302
--

0.126
0.072
0.018
0.138
0.218
-0.161
-0.745
-0.249
0.077
10.523
Yes

0.105
0.186
0.117
0.082
0.216
0.143
0.161
0.163
0.181
0.908

Prime rate
Duration spread
Term premium
Debt to assets
Fixed rate
Log total assets
Log amount
Collateral
Primary institution
Intercept
Loan type indicators
n
R2
F-stat

1,189
0.194
13.34

Partitioned Wald Tests of Joint Significance
Tests of Accrual Effect (from N = 0 to Y = 1) for: a
All firms
Credit Score
Credit Score
Relationship
Relationship

H
L
L
S

Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score

H
L
H
L

×
×
×
×

Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship

Estimate

-0.180
-0.319
-0.082
-1.326

L
L
S
S
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F-stat
3.59

p-value
0.0064

0.26
7.10
0.52
6.88

0.769
0.0009
0.592
0.0011

0.47
0.67
0.09
13.75

0.495
0.423
0.762
0.0002

Tests of Credit Score Effect (from L to H) for: b
All firms
Accrual
Accrual
Relationship
Relationship

Y
N
L
S

Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual

Y
Y
N
N

×
×
×
×

Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship

Estimate

L
S
L
S

Tests of Relationship Effect (from S to L) for: c
All firms
Accrual
Accrual
Credit Score
Credit Score

Y
N
H
L

Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual

Y
Y
N
N

×
×
×
×

Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score

F-stat
3.37

p-value
0.0095

0.23
6.47
0.11
6.61

0.797
0.0016
0.897
0.0014

0.159
0.155
0.021
-1.089

0.21
0.24
0.00
12.94

0.644
0.623
0.947
0.0003

Estimate

F-stat
2.17

p-value
0.070

0.00
4.34
0.06
4.25

0.999
0.0132
0.943
0.0145

0.00
0.00
0.12
8.49

0.987
0.984
0.734
0.0036

-0.004
-0.008
0.094
-1.016

H
L
H
L

Interest rate = α + β1to7Accrual(Y/N)×Credit score(H/L)×Relationship(L/S) + β8 Prime rate + β9Duration spread + β10Term
premium + β11Debt to assets + β12Fixed rate + β13Log total assets + β14Log amount + β15Collateral + β16Primary institution
Omitted interaction Accrual_N×Credit score_L×Relationship_S
Table reports OLS estimation. Regression includes loan type fixed effects. Dependent variable is the interest rate on the
entity’s most recent loan. Accrual Y (N) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm uses (do not use) accrual accounting,
zero otherwise. Credit Score H (L) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm has a credit score equal or above (below) the
sample median, zero otherwise. Relationship L (S) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm has a relationship length with
their loan provider longer (equal or less) than the sample median, zero otherwise. All remaining independent variables are
defined in Table 2.
a
Estimates the interest rate effect (coefficient, F-stat, and p-value) for firms that use accrual accounting (Accrual_Y) versus
firms who do not (Accrual_N) based on the model above for the listed sample partitions.
b
Estimates the interest rate effect (coefficient, F-stat, and p-value) for firms that have credit scores equal or above the sample
median (Credit score_H) versus firms who do not (Credit score_L) based on the model above for the listed sample partitions.
c
Estimates the interest rate effect (coefficient, F-stat, and p-value) for firms that have relationships with their financiers longer
than the sample median (Relationship_L) versus firms who do not (Relationship_S) based on the model above for the listed
sample partitions.
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Table 11
Determinants of interest rates using indicator variables partitioned by collateral

Collateral = 0
Independent variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual
Accrual

Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N

×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×

Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score

N
H
L
H
L
H
L
H
L

×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×

Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship

L
L
S
S
L
L
S
S

101
29
75
40
110
53
83
66

Prime rate
Duration spread
Term premium
Debt to assets
Fixed rate
Log total assets
Log amount
Primary institution
Intercept
Loan type indicators

Collateral = 1

Coefficient

Std. error

-1.872***
-1.874***
-1.825***
-2.061***
-1.449***
-1.726***
-1.696***
--

0.529
0.707
0.534
0.626
0.487
0.567
0.507
--

-0.127
0.220
-0.325
0.769
1.534***
-0.352
-0.855***
-0.189
13.623***
Yes

0.186
0.337
0.230
0.134
0.349
0.232
0.277
0.314
1.649

N

Coefficient Std. error

129
44
121
58
74
51
104
53

-0.311
-0.595
-0.474
-0.431
-0.341
-0.120
-0.309
--

0.358
0.432
0.357
0.393
0.373
0.406
0.346
--

0.355***
-0.029
0.301
0.212
0.732***
0.039
-0.661***
0.323
6.939***
Yes

0.112
0.199
0.121
0.096
0.255
0.169
0.184
0.199
1.003

556
0.213
7.25

n
R2
F-stat

633
0.175
7.70

Partitioned Wald Tests of Joint Significance
Tests of Accrual Effect (from N = 0 to Y = 1) for: a
All firms
Credit Score
Credit Score
Relationship
Relationship

H
L
L
S

Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score
Credit Score

H
L
H
L

×
×
×
×

Relationship
Relationship
Relationship
Relationship

Estimate

L
L
S
S

-0.423
-0.148
-0.129
-2.061
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F-stat
2.84

p-value
0.024

0.50
5.41
0.49
5.42
0.95
0.04
0.07
10.82

Estimate

F-stat
0.66

p-value
0.621

0.608
0.0047
0.613
0.0047

0.17
1.19
0.63
0.72

0.842
0.306
0.531
0.487

0.329
0.836
0.795
0.0011

0.01
1.24
0.32
1.20

0.923
0.266
0.573
0.273

Interest rate = α + β1to7Accrual(Y/N)×Credit score(H/L)×Relationship(L/S) + β8 Prime rate + β9Duration spread + β10Term
premium + β11Debt to assets + β12Fixed rate + β13Log total assets + β14Log amount + β15Primary institution
Omitted interaction Accrual_N×Credit score_L×Relationship_S
Table reports OLS estimation partitioned by whether collateral is provided for the loan. Regression includes loan type fixed
effects. Dependent variable is the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan. Accrual Y (N) is an indicator variable coded one if
the firm uses (do not use) accrual accounting, zero otherwise. Credit Score H (L) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm has
a credit score equal or above (below) the sample median, zero otherwise. Relationship L (S) is an indicator variable coded one if
the firm has a relationship length with their loan provider longer (equal or less) than the sample median, zero otherwise. All
remaining independent variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed),
respectively.
a
Estimates the interest rate effect (coefficient, F-stat, and p-value) for firms that use accrual accounting (Accrual_Y) versus firms
who do not (Accrual_N) based on the model above for the listed sample partitions.

54

